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I. INTRODUCTION
American society has long recognized the importance and value of an
individual's right to acquire, control, and transfer private property.' As a
general rule, an individual not only has the ultimate control over such proper-
ty with regard to gifts made during the person's lifetime, but also in the case
of disposition of the individual's property upon his or her death.2
When a person dies, there are generally three ways with which to distri-
bute the decedent's remaining personal property.3 First, the decedent can die
testate, that is, with a will.4 When a person dies testate, he or she is free to
devise property to, or disinherit, whomever he or she sees fit, without being
bound by stringent rules mandating who can, and who cannot, inherit from
the decedent.5 This testamentary freedom allows the decedent to determine
exactly who the intended beneficiaries of his or her will should be, including
individuals or classes of people who are not related to the decedent by mar-
riage, blood, or otherwise.6 Second, the decedent can die with a will substi-
tute, such as a revocable inter vivos trust, or life insurance.7 Lastly, the de-
cedent can die intestate, that is, without a valid will. 8 When a decedent dies
intestate, there is neither a testamentary inheritance nor disinheritance, so it
is difficult to ascertain the proper method of distributing his or her property.9
As a result, an intestate decedent's property will be distributed according to
the governing state's intestacy statutes.10
Intestacy statutes may vary from state to state, but as a general rule, in-
testacy statutes attempt to fill the intent gap and distribute property "in ac-
cordance with the probable intent of the average intestate decedent."" Thus,
1. Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach
to Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 374-75 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 375.
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009).
5. Michael J. Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cul-
tural Myopia of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223, 253 (2008).
A testator is a person who dies leaving a will. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (9th ed.
2009).
6. See Tritt, supra note 1, at 374.
7. Id. at 375. An inter vivos trust is "[a] trust that is created and takes effect during the
settlor's lifetime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (9th ed. 2009).
9. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1245 (Wyo. 2003).
10. Higdon, supra note 5, at 253.
II. Tritt, supra note I, at 380.
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most intestacy statutes provide a default distributive scheme that decedents
would be likely to follow if they had provided for the distribution of their
own estates.' 2 Typically, such statutes distribute the decedent's property first
to the decedent's surviving spouse, and then to the decedent's surviving
children, if any, and then to more remote descendants. 3 That being said,
because intestate succession is primarily a creation of statutory law, it is im-
portant to recognize the difference in treatment between persons authorized
to inherit under the laws of intestate succession and those who are not recog-
nized whatsoever.
Generally, intestacy statutes are explicit in providing children with the
right to inherit from an intestate parent.' 4 What is not clear, however, is the
meaning of "child" according to the statutory language and the bounds of the
parent-child relationship necessary to establish the right to intestate succes-
sion. For example, while "child" is generally understood to refer to the "nat-
ural relationship based upon biological reproduction," a child could also be
someone who was legally adopted by the decedent 5 or even someone who
was not legally adopted by the decedent, but nonetheless maintained a par-
ent-child relationship with the decedent.1 6 Accordingly, differentiating be-
tween the proper meaning of "child" within intestacy statutes will always be
the determining factor in deciding whether a child is entitled to a share of an
intestate decedent's estate.
A biological child will always be entitled to inherit from an intestate de-
cedent, as will a child who was formally legally adopted by the decedent.
7
As to the third scenario, however, in which the child was cared for, sup-
ported by, and educated by the decedent, and maintained a parent-child rela-
tionship with the decedent, it is unclear whether the child will be entitled to
inherit from the intestate decedent when no formal adoption proceedings
have been completed. Such is the case in a virtual adoption.
A virtual adoption occurs when a child was supposed to be legally
adopted but his or her adoptive parents failed to satisfy the legal require-
ments of a formal adoption.' 8 It is an equitable doctrine which generally
arises when the would-be adoptive parent dies intestate, and it operates to
12. Id. at 380-81.
13. Id. at 381.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 732.103(1) (2010).
15. Tritt, supra note 1, at 381.
16. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107 (N.D. 2000).
17. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.102(1), .108(1).
18. E.g., Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per cu-
riam). Virtual adoption is also sometimes called "equitable adoption," "adoption by estop-
pel," or "de facto adoption." McGarvey v. State, 533 A.2d 690, 690 (Md. 1987).
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allow the virtually adopted child to inherit from the intestate decedent.' 9
Thus, while the Uniform Probate Code is the ultimate authority on inherit-
ance in the case of an intestacy proceeding, virtual adoption is the well-
recognized exception to the statutory scheme. 20  Be that as it may, the en-
forcement of the doctrine of virtual adoption has yet to be applied consistent-
ly throughout the courts in this country.2 '
Employing principles of equity and public policy, probate courts have
come to recognize the necessity, legitimacy, and application of virtual adop-
tion in intestacy proceedings. However, with the steady increase in the
divorce rate23 and the rapid changes in "traditional" family life,24 the doctrine
is quickly spreading to other areas of law and is no longer limited to probate
matters.25 Nonetheless, there remain inconsistencies in its application and
the appropriate circumstances in which courts can invoke the doctrine to
provide relief for virtually adopted children. 6 As a result, virtual adoption
should no longer be looked at under limited, narrow circumstances, but
should instead be broadened to prevent unfair results for virtually adopted
children, just as the doctrine was intended to do.
This article will discuss the equitable doctrine of virtual adoption and
the need for, and implications of, expanding the doctrine outside of probate
19. E.g., Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322.
20. See Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at I 11.
21. See generally Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that a virtual adoption is not sufficient where the decedent is killed in an industrial acci-
dent and the virtually adopted child seeks compensation under the Workers' Compensation
Act); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that virtual
adoption does not apply to a minor child, who is neither the biological child nor legally
adopted child of the decedent, in the case of wrongful death). But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at
IIl (holding that virtual adoption does apply to child support obligations).
22. See generally Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
23. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: 2000, 14 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-
6.pdf.
24. Rebecca C. Bell, Comment, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of Creating an Excep-
tion to the Statutory Scheme, 29 STETSON L. REV. 415, 418 (1999).
25. See Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 108 (holding that public policy protects the welfare and
best interests of children, and that "child support guidelines do not preclude the imposition of
a child support obligation on one who has equitably adopted a child"). The court held:
Applying the doctrine of equitable adoption to impose a child support obligation, when the cir-
cumstances of the case require it, fully comports with this public policy.... [Niothing in the
law of [North Dakota] bars application of the doctrine in the context of a child support obliga-
tion. First, the existence of statutory adoption procedures does not forbid the proposed appli-
cation of the doctrine .... Rather, our adoption statutes and the doctrine of equitable adoption
coexist, operating side by side to promote the best interests of the child.
Id. at 105.
26. See Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 765. But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 97.
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court. The first section will outline the evolution from formal legal adop-
tions to the equitable virtual adoption, as well as highlighting the differences
in the rights and responsibilities of the respective parties. The second section
of the article will begin by discussing the history and reasoning behind the
doctrine, including the two theories upon which virtual adoption is based.
The third section will analyze each of the theories through a discussion of the
application of virtual adoption in other United States jurisdictions, with care-
ful attention to the specific facts of each case in which the doctrine was in-
voked or struck down. The fourth section will analyze virtual adoption
through a discussion of the application of the doctrine in Florida, specifically
focusing on the differences between Florida and the aforementioned jurisdic-
tions. The fifth section will discuss the major flaws in the application of
virtual adoption thus far and why virtual adoption is not just a probate issue
anymore. Throughout this article's entirety, it should become clear why the
doctrine should be expanded to areas of the law outside of probate court,
should be recognized by state legislatures, and should be given more weight
in today's society in order to afford virtually adopted children the protection
and justice they deserve.
II. ADOPTION: FROM LEGAL ADOPTION TO VIRTUAL ADOPTION
More than 2.1 million adopted children live in the United States. 27 Ac-
cording to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, more than 100,000 adopted child-
ren live in Florida alone.28 With such a vast number of children being
adopted yearly, it is no surprise that the legal rights of adopted children have
become exceedingly uncertain.29
Adoption is purely statutory in origin, as it was not recognized at com-
mon law.3" Being purely statutory, the state has a "compelling interest" in
finding stable, permanent homes for adoptive children.3' Moreover, courts
consider the adoptive child's best interest to be of utmost importance with
regard to specific findings in adoption proceedings. 32 Thus, the statutes
27. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 23, at 1.
28. Id. at 4.
29. See, e.g., Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767 (holding that virtual adoption would not warrant
relief in a worker's compensation proceeding). But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105 (holding
that virtual adoption would warrant relief in a divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father
to continue paying child support).
30. E.g., Samek v. Sanders, 788 So. 2d 872, 875 (Alaska 2000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 63.022(l)(a) (2009).
32. Id. § 63.022(2).
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which govern adoption are designed to ensure certainty" and to protect adop-
tive children from being adopted by "unsuitable persons."
3
Adoption is defined as the "establishment or creation of a legal relation-
ship of parent and child between persons who were not so related by nature
or law." 35 When a child has been legally adopted, the child's relationship
with his or her natural parents is deemed terminated, and the child becomes
the legal equivalent of the biological child of his or her adoptive parents.36
As such, the adoptive child is also entitled to the legal rights otherwise con-
ferred upon biological children, including acquiring the status of being the
adoptive parent's "legal heir.",37 Thus, the adopted child has all the rights
and responsibilities that a biological child would have, as an adopted child
and biological child are often regarded as one in the same. It therefore fol-
lows that the adopted child is entitled under the statutes of intestate succes-
sion to the property of his or her adoptive parents.38 Thus, in theory and in
practice, the adopted child is considered both a descendant of the adopting
parent and one of the natural kindred of the adopting parent's family.3 9
Although adoption has become more commonplace in today's society
than in decades past, the necessary steps to "legally" adopt a child have be-
come more extensive and demanding. The dynamic of the "typical" Ameri-
can family is rapidly evolving as well. n° Many Americans have differing
views of what an "adoptive" or "step" parent-child relationship entails, as
well as differing views on whether a formal adoption is deemed acceptable
within a particular cultural group.4  As a result, virtual adoptions are "more
common among some cultural groups than others, as people differ widely in
the way they view family relationships and the process of adoption. 42
Virtual adoption is an equitable remedy that is most often invoked to
protect someone "who was supposed to have been adopted as a child" but
who was not legally adopted because his or her parents failed to complete the
33. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).
34. Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 360 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
35. In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1239. Similarly, Florida defines adoption as "the
act of creating the legal relationship between parent and child where it did not exist." FLA.
STAT. § 63.032(2) (2010).
36. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1239.
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(20). Property is defined as "both real and personal property or
any interest in it and anything that may be the subject of ownership." Id. § 731.201(32).
39. Id. § 732.108(1).
40. See Bell, supra note 24, at 418 ('The issues involved in virtual adoption become
increasingly complex as family structures evolve to encompass relationships forming from
divorce, remarriage, and extended households .... ").
41. U.S. DEP'T OFCOMMERCE, supra note 23, at 2.
42. Id.
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steps necessary to establish a formal adoption.43 The doctrine was not
created as a means to supplement the legal relationship between a parent and
child."a Nor does the application of the doctrine change the status of a vir-
tually adopted child to that of a legally adopted child.45 Instead, the primary
function of virtual adoption is limited to allow a virtually adopted child to
inherit from an adoptive parent who dies intestate.46 Courts reason that when
an adoptive parent dies without a will, "there was neither a testamentary in-
heritance nor a testamentary disinheritance. '47 Accordingly, courts view the
doctrine as the appropriate means with which to fill the "intent 'gap' by al-
lowing the child to inherit as if he or she had been adopted., 48 Further, al-
though the majority of states recognize virtual adoption, the doctrine remains
narrowly tailored49 and is often invoked exclusively in courts of equity in
order to prevent "inequitable and unjust" results stemming from intestacy
statutes.5°
In its most basic form, virtual adoption can be established when a dece-
dent has expressly agreed to adopt a child, there was reliance on the agree-
ment by the child or the child's natural parents, and the decedent treated the
child as his or her own.5' Thus, when an intestate decedent's intent to raise
the child was unambiguous, a court of equity would invoke the doctrine of
virtual adoption so as to carry out the intent of the decedent to adopt and
provide for the child.52
Where a decedent's intent is ambiguous, however, courts face difficult
challenges in invoking the doctrine.53 As a result, a fundamental prerequisite
of virtual adoption is that there is some type of agreement between the natu-
ral and adoptive parents, be it oral or written.54 When an express agreement
has been made and relied upon, a court is more likely to treat a child as
though he or she was virtually adopted, thus allowing the child to inherit
43. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2003).
44. See Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
45. Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So. 2d
531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
46. In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1240.
47. Id. at 1245.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 1241.
50. Bd. of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 377 (Md. 1994).
51. E.g., Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So.
2d 531, 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
52. E.g., Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997).
53. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004).
54. Bell, supra note 24, at 419; Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d at 754; Johnson v. Johnson, 617
N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000).
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from the decedent's estate.55 However, while an agreement is necessary to
establish virtual adoption, it is not sufficient.56 Courts weigh several factors
in order to determine if a virtual adoption has taken place.57
To establish virtual adoption, a court of equity will employ one of two
theories.58 Under the contract theory, a court will order specific performance
of an agreement to adopt when the child can prove that there has been re-
liance on the agreement to adopt and partial performance by the decedent in
parenting the adoptive child.59 Under the estoppel theory, the decedent's
estate will be precluded from denying that a child was adopted, effectively
prohibiting the party from preventing the child from inheriting under intesta-
cy statutes. 60 Whichever theory a court applies, however, the authorities
concur that the application of the doctrine of virtual adoption will invariably
produce the same results.61
A. Specific Performance of an Agreement to Adopt: The Contract Theory
When a court grants equitable relief to a child based on the contract
theory, the court is merely enforcing an agreement to adopt between a child's
natural and adoptive parents.62 The object is that when an adoptive parent
acts as a promisor who agrees to raise and legally adopt a child, and there has
been part performance by the parties, courts will order specific performance
of the prior agreement to adopt.63
By its definition, specific performance calls for "[t]he rendering, as
nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment or de-
cree. '64 Thus, when a court orders specific performance of an agreement to
adopt, it appears as though the court is ordering an adoptive parent to com-
plete the necessary steps to legally adopt the child.65 However, because a
claim of virtual adoption does not come to fruition until after an adoptive
parent has died intestate, requiring the decedent to complete a formal adop-
55. E.g., Browning, 635 A.2d at 376-77.
56. See, e.g., Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge), 470 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
57. E.g., id.
58. E.g., Browning, 635 A.2d at 377.
59. See Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
60. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Wyo. 2003).
61. Browning, 635 A.2d at 377.
62. Lindsay Ayn Warner, Note, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida Can
Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETsON L. REV. 577, 589 (2009).
63. Id.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (9th ed. 2009).
65. Bell, supra note 24, at 425.
[Vol. 35
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/11
VIRTUAL ADOPTION
tion is impossible.66 As a result, virtual adoption cases that rely on the con-
tract theory often enforce specific performance based on the parties' part
performance of the agreement to adopt.67 Thus, although problems often
arise when a court orders specific performance, the ultimate goal of the con-
tract theory is to alleviate these problems and provide justice and equity for
the child.68
The contract theory is founded on the idea that because adoptive parents
have entered into an oral or written contract to adopt the child, granting a
claim of virtual adoption is best achieved through specific performance.69
However, while the majority of states recognize virtual adoption, the stan-
dards of proof are vague, and the requirements differ between the jurisdic-
tions which have invoked the doctrine.70 Nonetheless, although these ele-
ments may vary slightly across state lines,7' courts in every jurisdiction have
consistently held that in order to enforce specific performance of a contract,
the claimant must first establish an express agreement to adopt.72
In Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge),73 Florida's Fifth District
Court of Appeal held that a claim of virtual adoption would grant a child an
enforceable contract right, pursuant to the satisfaction of five elements.74
The court determined that the five elements required to establish virtual
adoption include:
1. an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents;
2. performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up cus-
tody;
3. performance by the child by living in the home of the adoptive
parents;
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. James R. Robinson, Comment, Untangling the "Loose Threads": Equitable Adop-
tion, Equitable Legitimation, and Inheritance in Extralegal Family Arrangements, 48 EMORY
L.J. 943, 956 (1999).
70. Bell, supra note 24, at 418.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 425. A rule calling for the analysis of the parties' overall relationship would be
vague and subjective. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford) 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004). Instead,
courts look to the "particular expressions of intent to adopt," id., and generally require the
existence of the parties' "mutual intent to create a legal relationship." Johnson v. Johnson,
617 N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000).
73. 470 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
74. Id. at 741.
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4. partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into
the home and treating the child as their child; and
5. intestacy of the foster parents.
75
"Sufficient evidence" was the governing standard to prove an agree-
ment to adopt,76 but the majority of courts now require that the claimant
prove the aforementioned elements by "clear and convincing evidence. 77
However, because virtual adoption is meant to carry out the decedent's intent
to adopt a child, a mutually affectionate relationship, absent any direct
agreement to adopt the child, is inherently insufficient to determine the dece-
dent's intent.78 Thus, courts generally permit the decedent's intent to enter
into a contract and adopt the claimant to be shown by a bevy of expressions,
including:
[P]roof of an unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt.
• . other acts or statements directly showing that the decedent in-
tended the child to be, or to be treated as, a legally adopted child..
. the decedent's statement of his or her intent to adopt the child, or
the decedent's representation to the claimant or to the community
at large that the claimant was the decedent's natural or legally
adopted child.79
In determining whether there is evidence of an agreement to adopt, be it
direct or indirect, courts look at the parties' objective manifestations, reason-
ing that the secret intentions of the parties are irrelevant. 80 Further, while an
agreement is necessary to create and enforce a contract, contracts also re-
quire consideration to be valid and binding. 8' That being said, however, con-
sideration is difficult to ascertain in a claim for virtual adoption: 82
[T]he status of the child is unclear. Is the child a third-party bene-
ficiary of the contract, or is the child a party to the agreement?...
[T]he notion that the child is a third-party beneficiary of the con-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Douglas v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Williams v. Estate of Pender, 738 So. 2d 453, 456 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 374 (W. Va. 1978).
78. Bean v. Ford (Estate of Ford), 82 P.3d 747, 753 (Cal. 2004).
79. Id. at 754.
80. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 108 (N.D. 2000); Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d at 754.
81. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
82. Robinson, supra note 69, at 956.
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tract is belied by the fact that he or she provides part of the "con-
sideration" that makes the contract enforceable, that is, living with
the equitably adoptive parents as their child.83
For this reason, upon proof of an unambiguous agreement, courts will
then look at the parties' performance of the contract in order to determine
whether it should be enforced in equity.84 Thus, where an unambiguous con-
tract is proven, both to adopt the child and to allow the child to inherit, 85 and
the contract is supported by valid and adequate consideration, the contract
will be enforced and the child will be treated as though he or she were legally
adopted for certain limited purposes.
86
B. Detrimental Reliance on an Agreement to Adopt: The Estoppel Theory
Like the contract theory, virtual adoption based on the estoppel theory is
also an equitable remedy that grants relief to the claimant when a statutory
adoption is incomplete, notwithstanding a prior agreement to adopt.87 Also
like the contract theory, some proof of an agreement to adopt is required.88
However, unlike the contract theory, the estoppel theory rests on the notion
that a court will uphold a child's adoptive status when the child and the de-
cedent maintained "a relationship consistent with that of [a biological] parent
and child., 89 Thus, when the claimant can prove "1) an agreement to adopt,
2) performance by the child, and 3) the child's reliance on the agreement or
belief in [his or her] adoptive status," then the claimant will be entitled to
equitable relief based on adoption by estoppel. 90
With the estoppel theory, what you see is what you get: as the name
implies, the theory places less emphasis on specific, delineated requirements,
and instead focuses on equity and justice.91 Therefore, when a child has re-
lied upon representations by the decedent as to the child's adoptive status,
the estoppel theory will grant the child the right to inherit from the dece-
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
85. Samek v. Sanders, 788 So. 2d 872, 875 (Alaska 2000).
86. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
87. See, e.g., Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App. 1995).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 580 (citing Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Tex. 1951) (emphasis
omitted)).
90. Id. at 579 (citing Defoeldvar v. Defoeldvar 666 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. App. 1984)
(emphasis omitted)).
91. Bell, supra note 24, at 425-26.
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dent's estate, despite the child's adoptive status. 92  In Calista Corp. v.
Mann,93 the court held:
Where one takes a child into his home as his own, thereby volunta-
rily assuming the status of parent, and by reason thereof obtains
from the child the love, affection, companionship, and services
which ordinarily accrue to a parent, he is thereafter estopped to as-
sert that he did not adopt the child in the manner provided by law.
94
Equity rests on the notion that "equity regards as done what ought to
have been done." 95 In granting relief under the estoppel theory, courts gen-
erally focus on the nature of the relationship between the decedent and the
child.96 When the statements, admissions, and conduct of the decedent are
such that they provide ample proof of an agreement to adopt, it is within the
court's discretion to infer such an agreement from that evidence.97 Thus,
while a court may insist on proof of an express agreement to adopt, it is not
necessary because "equity [will nonetheless] estop[] the foster parent and his
privies from denying the relationship they represented to the child., 98 There-
fore, with or without an express agreement to adopt, where the parties acted
in good faith under the impression that the child was adopted, the decedent's
estate will be estopped from preventing the child from inheriting from the
intestate decedent.
99
92. See, e.g., id. at 426 ("Reliance provides the grounds for promissory estoppel, which is
applied as an equitable remedy when justice requires.").
93. 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
94. Id. at 61 (quoting Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974)).
95. Bell, supra note 24, at 425-26.
96. E.g., id. at 426.
97. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61.
98. Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get
What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intes-
tate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 775 (1984).
99. See id. But see Otero v. City of Albuquerque, 965 P.2d 354, 361 (N.M. Ct. App.
1998) ("[T]he equitably adopted child should not be treated as the legal child of the equitable
parent for all purposes. Only one who has detrimentally relied can claim an estoppel, and
only one who has caused the reliance can be estopped.") (citations omitted).
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III. OTHER STATES AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION
The majority of states will grant equitable relief for a virtually adopted
child in one form or another. 1°° Of at least thirty-eight jurisdictions that have
considered the doctrine, no less than twenty-seven have recognized and
upheld a claim of virtual adoption in intestate proceedings.' However, al-
though the doctrine is generally invoked in limited circumstances, several
courts have broadened the doctrine and applied it in unique situations in or-
der to avoid the unjust results of strict adherence to the law. 10 2 Likewise, a
handful of jurisdictions have upheld claims of virtual adoption in legal pro-
ceedings outside the realm of probate court.
10 3
A. Uniquely Divergent Cultures Necessitate Virtual Adoption: Calista
Corp. v. Mann
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that the doctrine of virtual
adoption is an appropriate remedy in intestate proceedings. 104 In Calista
Corp., a case of first impression in Alaska, the claimants were the adoptive
daughters of shareholders of Calista Corp., and each sought the shares of the
corporation that they claimed to be entitled to under the Alaskan laws of in-
testate succession. 05  In order to inherit through the intestacy statutes,
Alaska required that the claimants qualified as "issue" of the decedents,
meaning "lineal descendants of all generations, with the relationship of par-
ent and child at each generation. ' 06 However, neither of the claimants were
the biological children of the decedents; instead, the girls claimed that they
were "culturally" or "traditionally" adopted by the deceased shareholders. 107
100. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 2003)
(stating that "[t]he majority of states recognize equitable adoption").
101. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 606 (N.C. 1997).
102. See, e.g., Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61 (holding that the unique cultural mosaic of the
Alaskan community justified the recognition of a virtual adoption claim); Luna v. Estate of
Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex. App. 1995) (applying a less stringent standard with
which to find that the claimant was the virtually adopted son of the decedent).
103. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 104 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual
adoption applies to child support obligations).
104. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61.
105. Id. at 54-55. In Calista Corp., there were two claimants: Katie Mann, who was
seeking shares of Calista Corporation and Sea Lion Corporation stock, and Catherine Peters,
who was seeking shares of Calista Corporation and Bethel Native Corporation stock. Id. at
55.
106. Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
107. Id.
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The appellant took the position that adoption, unknown at common law,
is purely statutory and that it must be "affirmatively proved by the person
claiming its existence."'' 0 8 The appellant argued that the laws of Alaska
"provide[d] the exclusive method for adoption" and, therefore, that the clai-
mants were not the children of the decedents for purposes of intestate proper-
ty distribution.'w Despite this argument, however, the appellant's reasoning
was flawed because he ignored the holdings from the twenty-six states that
had recognized virtual adoption and instead relied on the decisions from the
eight states that refused to recognize the doctrine." 0
Nonetheless, the court agreed with the claimants and held that equity
would be employed to avoid hardship to the child of an intestate decedent,
even if there was no valid legal adoption."1 ' The court analyzed the diversity
of cultures in Alaska and reasoned that the "cultural mosaic" of the Alaskan
community made it difficult to achieve "a unified justice system sensitive to
the needs of the various cultures."' 12 Accordingly, the court held that the
unique makeup of the native Alaskan community called for the implementa-
tion of the doctrine of virtual adoption in order to avoid unjust and intolera-
ble results to the adoptive children of intestate decedents." 3
B. Adoption by Estoppel at Work: Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez
In Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez,'14 the appellate court in Texas held that
equity requires a decree of adoption by estoppel when there is convincing
evidence of the necessary elements to establish a cause of action for a virtual
adoption by estoppel." 5 In Luna, Christopher Luna, the claimant, was the
biological son of Mary Helen Luna and the alleged adoptive son of the dece-
dent, Henry Rodriquez." 6 When the decedent died intestate, Christopher
attempted to determine his heirship, alleging his status to be that of the dece-
108. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 60 (quoting In re Bradley, 6 Alaska 89,91 (1918)).
109. Id. at 59-60.
110. See id. at 60.
111. See id. at 61-62.
112. Id. at 61.
113. Calista Corp., 564 P.2d at 61-62.
114. 906 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App. 1995).
115. Id. at 581.
116. Id. at 578. Mary Helen had been awarded custody of Christopher when she divorced
Christopher's biological father, Alfred Luna. Id. Although Alfred's parental rights were
never terminated, Christopher alleged that he had a distant relationship with his biological
father and that his natural father had abandoned him. Id. Christopher also claimed that he
was "reared, cared for, and clothed" by the decedent, that he referred to the decedent as "dad,"
and that he was known in the community as the decedent's son. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 578.
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dent's equitably adopted son.' 17 However, when Christopher filed his appli-
cation for declaration of heirship, he was met with opposition from the dece-
dent's brother and second wife.1"8 The trial court agreed with the defendants,
holding that Christopher failed to allege certain required elements of virtual
adoption, but the court of appeals ultimately reversed that decision." 9
To establish adoption by estoppel, there must be "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence" of an agreement to adopt, coupled with perfor-
mance by the child in reliance on that agreement. 20 However, in Luna, the
appellate court reassessed the requisite elements to establish adoption by
estoppel and reversed the trial court, holding that proof of an agreement can
be shown by "circumstantial evidence. 12' The court also held that the
agreement can be made "with the child, the child's parents, or someone in
loco parentis. ' '122 Thus, where the child's natural parent has abandoned the
child, an agreement with the other natural parent is satisfactory to prove that
an agreement to adopt has taken place. 23 Looking at the record, the court
determined that an agreement to adopt did take place between the decedent
and the claimant's mother, and that the claimant relied on that agreement "by
conferring love, affection, companionship, and other benefits" to the dece-
dent.' 24 In the end, the court employed a lower standard to prove adoption by
estoppel, determined that Christopher's application for heirship did allege the
essential elements of virtual adoption by estoppel, and reversed the decision
of the trial court.
125
C. Virtual Adoption Compels the Imposition of Child Support Obligations:
Johnson v. Johnson
When a child is the center of a legal proceeding, the court will look to
fulfill the best interests of the child and make decisions which both reflect
and enhance the child's well-being.1 26 In Johnson v. Johnson,127 the Supreme
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 578, 583.
120. Id. at 581. A child who acts in reliance on an agreement does not necessarily act in
reliance "on an agreement to adopt or on representations about adoptive status," but rather he
acts in reliance on his belief in his "status" as an adopted child. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 581.
121. Id.
122. Id. Loco parentis is defined as "[siupervision of a young adult by an administrative
body such as a university." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009).
123. Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 581.
124. Id. at582.
125. See id.
126. See Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
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Court of North Dakota employed this line of reasoning and refused to restrict
the application of virtual adoption, holding that the facts and circumstances
of the case warranted the imposition of child support on the virtually adopted
child's father.'28
In Johnson, Madonna and Antonyio Johnson acted as Jessica's natural
parents since she was three months old, and they led her to believe that she
was their child for all intents and purposes. 129 For example,
Antonyio listed Jessica as his dependent on his federal tax returns.
The Air Force listed Jessica as Antonyio's dependent daughter on
his transfer orders and for medical benefits, placing her under his
social security number.... [T]he Johnsons consistently called her
Jessica Johnson. Jessica was baptized in Antonyio's family's
church in Georgia .... 130
Thus, although they never formally adopted her, the Johnsons instituted
adoption proceedings in two different states and regularly maintained that
Jessica was their daughter. 13' However, when the Johnsons later divorced,
there was some debate as to Jessica's adoptive status and, accordingly, Ma-
donna's right to child support from Antonyio. 132 The trial court ruled in fa-
vor of Antonyio, determining that he was not obligated to pay child support;
however, when Madonna later appealed the decision, the court looked at the
relationship of Jessica and Antonyio and reversed that decision.133
The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that a contract to adopt is
necessary to establish virtual adoption in inheritance proceedings, but it is
not sufficient in the domestic context.13 4 Courts generally require more di-
rect evidence supporting the notion that there is a true parent-child relation-
ship between the parties. 135 Here, the court likened Jessica and Antonyio's
relationship to that of a stepparent and stepchild, but determined that the con-
tract to adopt Jessica took the case outside the realm of normal stepparent-
stepchild obligations. 36 The court reasoned that in a normal stepparent-
stepchild relationship,
127. 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).
128. Id. at 105.
129. Id. at 100.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 100.
132. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 108-09.
135. See id. at 109.
136. Id. at 107-08.
[Vol. 35
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/11
VIRTUAL ADOPTION
the child is aware that the stepparent is just that, the spouse of the
child's natural parent .... [But] [i]n the case at bar, Antonyio and
Madonna led Jessica to believe she was their natural child ....
[T]he parties engaged in an elaborate fiction, which is not a part of
the normal stepparent-stepchild relationship.. ..' 37
Thus, although there was a contract to adopt Jessica, the court also looked at
the nature of the relationship between Jessica and Antonyio.
138
The court ultimately determined that Jessica and Antonyio's relation-
ship was comparable with that of a true parent and child, and therefore justi-
fied the imposition of Antonyio's child support obligations as Jessica's adop-
tive father. 3 9 The court reasoned that statutory adoption and virtual adoption
coexist and that North Dakota's public policy required the "protection of the
welfare and best interests of children."' 40  Moreover, looking at the "in-
creased prevalence of blended families in [today's] society," the court held
that constraining the application of virtual adoption to inheritance proceed-
ings would be "detrimental" to virtually adopted children.' 4'
D. The Inequities of a Testate Estate: In re Estate of Seader
It is well settled that virtual adoption is an equitable doctrine that is
generally limited to intestacy proceedings. 142 However, Sanderson v. Bath-
rick (In re Estate of Seader)143 challenged this long-standing principle when
the decedent's grandsons sought to inherit their mother's share of the dece-
dent's estate, as it was devised to their mother in the decedent's will.'"
The claimants, Kim and Kirk Olive, were the biological children of Ju-
lie, the virtually adopted daughter of the decedent. 145 In his will, the dece-
dent left one-third of his estate to Julie and the remaining interest to his two
biological sons. 14 6 However, Julie died before the decedent, and the other
137. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 107-08.
138. See id. at 109.
139. Id. In its decision, the court noted that North Dakota precedent justified the recogni-
tion of virtual adoption in the context of child support and child custody. Id. at 105. Further,
although virtual adoption had previously been applied primarily to inheritance proceedings,
the court found that the State's child support guidelines did not prohibit the imposition of
child support obligations on a parent who has virtually adopted a child. See id. at 108.
140. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
141. Id. at 107.
142. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1241 (Wyo. 2003).
143. 76 P.3d 1236 (Wyo. 2003).
144. Id. at 1237-38.
145. Id. at 1238.
146. Id.
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beneficiaries of the estate challenged Kim and Kirk's ability to inherit their
mother's share of her adoptive father's estate. 1
47
The decedent's biological sons argued that Julie's share had lapsed,
prohibiting her sons from inheriting her share, and that Julie's share therefore
was to be divided between her brothers. 148 However, according to Wyoming
statutes, whether or not Julie's share had lapsed would be contingent upon
the court finding Julie to be a "lineal descendent" of the decedent's grandpa-
rent. 1 49 The court ultimately determined that Julie was not the collateral rela-
tive or lineal descendent of the decedent, either biologically or through legal
adoption, and therefore did not qualify as a lineal descendent under the sta-
tute. 150
When a decedent dies testate, the court is to fulfill the decedent's intent
as it is laid out in the terms of the will. 15' Thus, although Julie was not legal-
ly adopted by the decedent, she was nonetheless entitled to a portion of his
estate as per the terms of his will. 52 Notwithstanding Julie's right to inherit-
ance, however, the court ultimately concluded that the statute was unambi-
guous and could not be applied to an equitable doctrine in order to "broaden
the class of persons identified by the statute."'' 53 Accordingly, because Julie
was not a lineal descendent of the decedent, her biological children could not
invoke the doctrine of virtual adoption to a testate estate in order to inherit
their mother's share of the estate. 154
147. Id.
148. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1245.
149. Id. The court held:
The phrase "lineal descendent" is not defined in the statute. The word "lineal" connotes
"a direct blood relative," and "lineal descent" indicates "[diescent in a direct or straight line, as
from father or grandfather to son or grandson." "Lineal descent" is contrasted with "collateral
descent," which refers to "descent in a collateral or oblique line, from brother to brother or
cousin to cousin. With collateral descent, the donor and donee are related through a common
ancestor.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See In re Estate of Seader, 76 P.3d at 1245 (holding that equitable adoption is the
judicial remedy for an intent "gap" when the decedent dies intestate, but that a decedent who
dies testate avoids judicial intervention since "there is no gap to be filled. We know the dece-
dent's intent from the terms of the will.").
153. Id. "This case serves as a good example of why the doctrine of equitable adoption
should not be applied to testate estates-the result may negate both legislative and testamenta-
ry intent." Id. at 1245-46.
154. See id. at 1245.
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IV. FLORIDA AND VIRTUAL ADOPTION
Every court that considers a claim for virtual adoption adheres closely
to the equitable maxim "equity regards that as done which ought to have
been done."' 5 In theory, the doctrine serves to promote fairness and justice
and seeks to protect children who were not formally or legally adopted ac-
cording to statutory requirements. 56 The doctrine was originally intended to
allow children of intestate decedents to inherit as though the children were
legally adopted. 57 However, because virtual adoption is an equitable reme-
dy, many courts have broadened the doctrine and applied it in other areas of
the law as well. 158 These courts reason that despite a child's adoptive status,
the child should nonetheless be put in the same position as though he or she
were naturally born or formally adopted.159
The state of Florida first recognized the doctrine of virtual adoption in
1943, but the Supreme Court of Florida stopped short of setting forth any
definitive requirements to establish the doctrine or circumstances that would
render the application of the doctrine appropriate.16° Instead, the court relied
on case law from other jurisdictions and applied a broad standard with which
to determine that the claimant was entitled to equitable relief.
16
'
Although Florida did not set the precedent for virtual adoption cases,
the doctrine has evolved in the almost seventy years that it has been recog-
nized in Florida. 62 Be that as it may, Florida courts have yet to follow their
out-of-state counterparts in granting equitable relief to virtually adopted
children outside of probate court. 163 Thus, while other jurisdictions have
155. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1943); Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d
604, 606 (N.C. 1997); Kelley v. Flagship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall),
502 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
156. Warner, supra note 62, at 583. For a discussion of the statutory elements, see pages
557-59, supra.
157. E.g., Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419-20.
158. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that the virtually adopted child of the decedent was considered an "heir" and there-
fore entitled to the decedent's property as per Florida's homestead provision); Johnson v.
Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adoption applies to child sup-
port obligations).
159. See, e.g., Johnson, 617 N.W.2d. at 108.
160. See Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419-20.
161. See Part IV(A), infra.
162. Warner, supra note 62, at 584.
163. See Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)
(holding that virtual adoption does not warrant compensation in the case of a virtually adopted
adult); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 774-5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that virtual adoption does not warrant compensation in the case of a wrongful death); Tarver
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recognized the rights of virtually adopted children in cases regarding child
support obligations and child custody, Florida courts consistently limit the
doctrine to intestacy proceedings.' 64 As a result, many children in Florida
continue to suffer from the injustice that the equitable doctrine of virtual
adoption was intended to counteract. 65
A. Florida Invokes the Doctrine of Virtual Adoption: The Case of Shef-
field v. Barry
In the landmark case Sheffield v. Barry, 6" the Supreme Court of Florida
held that an oral contract to adopt would be an enforceable contract right
where there was "performance on the one part and partial performance on the
other.' 167 In Sheffield, the child's natural mother and adoptive parents agreed
that the latter would assume all parental rights of the child, but the adoptive
father died intestate before finalizing the child's formal adoption. 68 Thus,
although the child had no adequate remedy at law, the court relied upon
precedent from other jurisdictions and held that the child was nonetheless
entitled to equitable relief. 1
69
In Sheffield, it was unclear whether the agreement to adopt was oral or
written, but the court held that such a distinction would be negligible in a
case of virtual adoption. 70 Instead, the court focused on the relationship
between the child and the decedent in order to determine the child's rights to
the decedent's estate. 17' The court reasoned that although the decedent failed
to legally adopt the child, the partial performance of his parental obligations
v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (holding that virtual adoption
does not warrant compensation in the case of a worker's compensation proceeding).
164. See Warner, supra note 62, at 587-88.
165. See Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322; Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775; Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
166. 14 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1943) (en banc).
167. Id. at 420.
168. Id. at 418-19. The adoptive mother died in 1934 and the adoptive father died intes-
tate in 1942. Id. at 419. However, throughout the adoptive parents' lives, the child was told,
and believed, that she had been legally adopted. Id. at 418. It was not until her adoptive
father died in 1942 that she learned that she was not legally adopted. Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at
418-19.
169. Id. at 419-20. Prior to Sheffield, a child who was not legally adopted had no inherit-
ance rights under Florida's intestacy statutes. See id. at 419. However, it was the plaintiffs
contention that the Court "should invoke in her behalf the equitable maxim: equity regards
that as done which ought to have been done," and the Court agreed, stating: "We have the
view that this relief was justified and that the equitable maxim is appropriate to the condition
reflected in the pleading." Id.
170. Id. at 420.
171. See Sheffield, 14 So. 2d at 419.
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gave the child an enforceable contract right, ultimately allowing her to inhe-
rit from his estate.112 In the end, the court applied basic theories of contract
law, holding that the child was entitled to specific performance of the agree-
ment to adopt between the child's natural mother and adoptive parents.'
73
B. The Doctrine Begins to Take Shape: Laney v. Roberts
In 1982, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that a virtual
adoption had taken place, despite the fact that the claimant knew she was not
legally adopted. 174 In Laney v. Roberts, 75 the claimant's biological parents
entered into an agreement with the Merickels, the child's aunt and uncle,
which stipulated that the Merickels were to adopt, raise, and educate the
child to the best of their ability. 76 Accordingly, when Mary Irene (Irene)
began living with the Merickels in 1932, she renounced all ties with her bio-
logical parents and referred to her aunt and uncle as "mother and dad."'77
Moreover, Irene considered the Merickels to be her parents and lived with
them until she got married.'7 8
When Mrs. Merickel died, however, Irene was prevented from inherit-
ing from her estate.' 79 The trial court held that Irene was not the legally or
virtually adopted daughter of the decedent, as evidenced by the fact that she
signed her marriage certificate with her birth name, and not the decedent's
last name. 80 Nonetheless, taking this isolated incident into consideration, the
court determined that "[s]uch paltry evidence" was insufficient to overcome
the breadth of evidence establishing Irene's adoptive status.' 8 '
On appeal, the court applied the reasoning employed in Sheffield and
held that specific performance of an agreement to adopt would be granted
when the last surviving foster parent dies intestate.'82 Thus, in spite of the
fact that Irene did not learn of the agreement between her parents and the
172. Id.
173. See id. (holding that the child should be entitled to the rights of the estate that she
would have had, had her adoption been legalized).
174. See Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
175. 409 So. 2d 201 (Ha. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
176. Id. at 202.
177. Id. at 201-02.
178. See id. at 202.
179. Id. at 202-03. Mr. Merickel died intestate in 1979 and Mrs. Merickel died intestate
later that year. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 202. Irene later brought an action against the co-personal
representatives of Mrs. Merickel's estate claiming that she had been virtually adopted by the
Merickels, but the trial court disagreed. Id. at 202-03.
180. See id. at 203.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 203.
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Merickels until Mrs. Merickel's death, the court determined that she had
established the elements of virtual adoption by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 83 The court reasoned that Irene's performance was "satisfied by liv-
ing in the home of the [Merickels]" and that her lack of knowledge of the
agreement was therefore irrelevant."8
C. Virtual Adoption and Florida's Homestead Provision: Williams v.
Dorrell
Florida's homestead provision provides, in pertinent part, that a dece-
dent's property is exempt from a court-ordered sale of the property and that
the exemption "'shall inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner. '-185
Under Florida law, the term "heirs" is defined as "those persons ... who are
entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a dece-
dent."'86 However, in order to determine legal heirs for the purpose of intes-
tate succession of real or personal property, Florida's homestead provision
applies a loose interpretation of Florida's intestacy statutes.'87
In Williams v. Dorrell,88 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held
that a virtually adopted child constituted an "heir" for the purpose of Flori-
da's homestead provision.'89 The court determined that the claimant satisfied
the requisite elements necessary to establish that she was the virtually
adopted daughter of the decedent.' 90 As such, the court held that Florida's
homestead provision extended to include a virtually adopted child, and the
claimant was therefore entitled to an interest in the decedent's property. 9'
D. The Inequities of the Equitable Doctrine
1. A Contract to Adopt Is Insufficient
A claim of virtual adoption invariably begins with an agreement to
adopt.' 92 Thus, when a claimant can establish that there is direct evidence of
183. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 203.
184. Id.
185. Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting FLA.
CONST. art X, § 4(b)).
186. FLA. STAT. § 731.201(20) (2010).
187. Williams, 714 So. 2d at 576.
188. 714 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
189. Id. at 576.
190. Id. at 575.
191. Id. at576.
192. Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
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an oral or written contract providing for the child's adoption, courts are more
inclined to continue with a virtual adoption analysis. 193 Nevertheless, even if
a claimant can prove the elements of virtual adoption by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, courts are still reluctant to expand the doctrine beyond its con-
ventional reach.
194
In Grant v. Sedco,195 Mikel Marks was raised by the decedent pursuant
to an agreement between the decedent and Marks' biological mother. 96 Al-
though he was never legally adopted, Marks was the decedent's child in the
traditional sense.' 97 However, when the decedent died in an automobile ac-
cident, Marks was denied compensation for his adoptive mother's death. 98
The court recognized that Marks was the virtually adopted son of the
decedent for all intents and purposes, but nonetheless held that virtual adop-
tion would not warrant relief in the case of wrongful death. 99 The court rea-
soned that a virtual adoption provides an equitable remedy through the en-
forcement of a contract right but that it does not create the relationship of a
parent and child.200 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Florida
Wrongful Death Act would not grant relief to a minor child that is neither the
natural or legally adopted child of the decedent.2°'
Ten years later, the Supreme Court of Florida relied on the arguments
set forth in Grant and ruled that a virtual adoption would not warrant relief in
the case of a worker's compensation proceeding.20 2 In Tarver v. Evergreen
Sod Farms, Inc.,2°3 the court ultimately held that a virtual adoption was not
akin to a legal adoption, despite the fact that the elements of virtual adoption
193. See, e.g., id.
194. See generally Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988)
(holding that a virtual adoption is not sufficient where the decedent is killed in an industrial
accident and the virtually adopted child seeks compensation under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that virtual adoption does not apply to a minor child, who is neither the biological child nor
legally adopted child of the decedent, in the case of wrongful death). But see Johnson v.
Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adoption applies to child sup-
port obligations).
195. 364 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
196. Id. at 774.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 775 ("Although the limitations upon recovery by an equitably adopted child
might seem harsh, the Florida Wrongful Death Act does not compensate all those aggrieved
by the death of another. It only compensates some and in certain ways.").
200. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
201. Id.
202. Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 766-67 (Fla. 1988).
203. 533 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1988).
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had been satisfied.2°4 The court reasoned that the doctrine of virtual adoption
is intended to avoid unfair results stemming from intestacy statutes, and it is
not to be utilized before the death of an adoptive parent.205 The court con-
cluded that the worker's compensation statute was unambiguous and, accor-
dingly, refused to extend the doctrine of virtual adoption to a worker's com-
pensation claim.
20 6
In 1991, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal again denied the peti-
tioner, the virtually adopted son of the decedent, the relief that he sought.
207
In Miller v. Paczier,208 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held that a
claim of virtual adoption, while a valid and well-recognized exception to the
Florida Probate Code, is not applicable when the claimant is an adult. 20 9 In
Miller, the claimant was the decedent's adult nephew who asserted that he
was entitled to the decedent's estate as the decedent's adopted son and not as
the decedent's nephew.2 0 Focusing on the nature of the relationship between
the claimant and the decedent, it was evident that the two had developed a
stronger bond than that of a typical nephew and aunt or uncle.21 ' Notwith-
standing his adoptive status, however, the court declined to extend the doc-
trine to virtually adopted adults.212 The court reasoned that expanding the
doctrine "beyond the purpose for which it was conceived [would] open the
door of the probate courts to fraudulent and frivolous claims.
213
204. Id. at 767.
205. Id.
206. Id. Under the worker's compensation statute, "'Child' includes a posthumous child, a
child legally adopted prior to the injury of the employee, and a stepchild or acknowledged
illegitimate child dependent upon the deceased." Id. at 766 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.02(5)
(1988)). The court held that a virtual adoption "[did] not create the legal relationship of parent
and child within the meaning of 'legal adoption' as required in the workers' compensation
statute." Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
207. Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
208. 591 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 323.
210. Id. at 322 The court proffered:
[The claimant] alleges that during his adulthood, he developed a close relationship with his
aunt and uncle, to the point that they regarded him as a son. He contends that this close rela-
tionship gave rise to an implied contract to adopt him and that he should take an intestate share
as a son, rather than the smaller share he would receive as a nephew.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322-23.
213. Id. at 323.
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2. "Enough" Is Not Enough
Since 1943, Florida courts have honored and enforced an oral or written
agreement to adopt when a virtually adopted child's parent dies intestate.1 4
In Sheffield, Florida's seminal virtual adoption case, the court recognized a
claim for virtual adoption, 215 but the court's decision did little to develop the
doctrine.21 6 It was not until 1985 that Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal
set forth the essential elements required to establish virtual adoption. 17
In order to determine that a claimant has been virtually adopted, he or
she must prove the necessary elements to establish that an adoption has taken
place.218 When a claimant cannot establish all five elements by clear and
convincing evidence, however, a court will not grant the claimant the relief
that he or she seeks.219
In Urick v. McFarland,220 Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
held that without an agreement to adopt, satisfaction of the remaining ele-
ments of virtual adoption would not suffice.22' In Urick, George Urick lived
with his mother and the decedent in the same capacity as that of a traditional
family, and Urick maintained a true parent-child relationship with the dece-
dent.222 Further, although the decedent never adopted him, "Mr. Urick ac-
cepted [the decedent] as his 'dad,' and [the decedent] treated Mr. Urick like a
214. Poole v. Burnett (In re Heirs of Hodge), 470 So. 2d 740, 741 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
215. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1943) (en banc).
216. See, e.g., Williams v. Estate of Pender, 738 So. 2d 453, 454 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
217. In re Heirs of Hodge, 470 So. 2d at 741. Before Hodge, Florida courts deciding
virtual adoption claims often adopted the reasoning set forth by other jurisdictions, noting that
virtual adoption was a "rarity" in Florida. See id. Be that as it may, probate courts throughout
the state have long required that a claim for virtual adoption be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. See Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
218. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrel, 714 So. 2d 574, 575-76 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
219. See, e.g., Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) ("Despite the failure of proof on the fourth element, the probate court
found-based on equitable principles-that a virtual adoption had occurred. Here, the probate
court fell into error."); Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) ("Although [the claimant] proved all remaining elements of [virtual adoption], without
proof of the agreement he cannot prevail.").
220. 625 So. 2d at 1253 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
221. Id. at 1254.
222. Id. at 1253-54. George Urick's biological parents got divorced when he was three
years old, but Urick continued to live with his father until he was fifteen. Id. at 1253. When
Urick's biological father died, however, Urick began living with his mother and the decedent.
Id. at 1253. Although the decedent never adopted Urick, they maintained the relationship of a
father and son. Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
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son." '223 When the decedent died, however, Urick was not entitled to any of
the decedent's estate.2 24 The court reasoned that although Urick had "ful-
filled the responsibilities that usually befall a son," Urick had nonetheless
failed to prove an agreement to adopt between the decedent and Urick's nat-
ural parents.2  Consequently, despite Urick's proof of all of the remaining
elements of virtual adoption, the court held that "without proof of the agree-
ment, he cannot prevail. 226 As such, Urick was not the virtually adopted son
of the decedent and, accordingly, the court denied George Urick's claim to
inherit from the decedent's estate.227
Nearly fifteen years after its decision in Urick, Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal again determined that failure to prove all five elements
would not be sufficient to prevail on a claim of virtual adoption.2 8 In Doug-
lass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil),229 the court reiterated its previous
holding that the elements of virtual adoption must all be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.230 Thus, while there may be evidence supporting some
of the required elements, anything short of "clear and convincing" is not
enough. 31
V. VIRTUAL ADOPTION OUTSIDE OF PROBATE COURT
A legally adopted child is afforded all the rights and privileges that bio-
logical children enjoy.232 Thus, regardless of the nature of the relationship
between an adoptive parent and child, the child will nonetheless be treated as
the lineal descendent of that parent.233 That being said, when an adoptive
223. Id. at 1253.
224. Id. Both Urick's mother and the decedent died intestate. Id. at 1254. Urick's mother
died before the decedent, and upon her death the decedent received the majority of his wife's
property. Id. Thus, in order for Urick to inherit from the decedent, he would have to be a
"lineal descendent." Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 1253.
228. Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2007).
229. 965 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
230. Id. at 1160.
231. See id. at 1161 ("[T]he probate court's findings establish without question that [the
claimant] did not prove the fourth element of virtual adoption by clear and convincing evi-
dence. Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the probate court's final order ... [that the
claimant] was the virtually adopted son of the decedent.").
232. Sanderson v. Bathrick (In re Estate of Seader), 76 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 2003).
233. FLA. STAT. § 732.108(l) (2010).
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parent dies intestate, his or her biological children and legally adopted child-
ren will be considered equally under Florida's intestacy statutes.
234
On the contrary, however, when an agreement or promise to adopt a
child has not come to fruition in the eyes of the law, that child may not be
recognized at all.23" Accordingly, regardless of the nature of the relationship
between the alleged adoptive parent and child, the child may nonetheless be
treated as though he or she has no ties whatsoever to the parent. 36 Conse-
quently, when an alleged adoptive parent dies intestate, his or her alleged
adopted children may have no remedy at all, legal or equitable.237
Virtual adoption is the judicially created doctrine intended to resolve
this ethical quandary.238 Being an equitable remedy, it is most often em-
ployed in order to avoid the injustice that flows from intestacy statutes.239 To
date, virtual adoption has been recognized in a number of cases in which the
decedent died intestate, and but for this equitable remedy, the claimants
would otherwise be without any recourse.240 Be that as it may, virtual adop-
tion is an extremely limited doctrine and, needless to say, so too are the
rights of those who are virtually adopted.
Virtual adoption is founded on the notion that when a parent dies intes-
tate, the child should not be precluded from inheriting from the decedent's
estate, despite the parent's failure to procure a legal adoption. 24' Hence, the
doctrine has traditionally been limited to intestacy proceedings and has found
little merit outside of probate court.242 Further, although virtual adoption has
made extensive progress since its inception in Florida in 1943, the doctrine
still remains unpredictable. Unlike other jurisdictions which have already
exhibited their willingness to progress at the same rate as today's population,
Florida has yet to see the correlation between strong public policy in favor of
the family unit and applying this policy in virtual adoption proceedings out-
side of probate court. As a result, Florida is falling by the wayside as it
shockingly seeks to inhibit the rights of its citizens both in law and in equity.
234. Id.
235. See Warner, supra note 62, at 586.
236. See, e.g., Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
237. See id.
238. Warner, supra note 62, at 583.
239. Bd. of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 377 (Md. 1994).
240. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977); Sheffield v. Barry, 14
So. 2d 417, 419-20 (Fla. 1943) (en banc); Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 581 (Tex. App. 1995).
241. Warner, supra note 62, at 583.
242. See, e.g., Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
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A. Florida Fails to Follow Suit: Inconsistencies Lead to an Inequitable
Doctrine
Florida courts have many a time granted and denied atypical claims of
virtually adopted children, often leading to ambiguous and inconsistent re-
sults.2 43 For example, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal has pre-
viously held that virtual adoption would warrant relief in an intestacy pro-
ceeding, but not in the case of a wrongful death. 244 Similarly, Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal explicitly denied the claims of virtually adopted
adults, reasoning that expanding the doctrine would propel it beyond its in-
tended purpose.245 Notwithstanding these decisions, however, the court had
no qualms about extending the doctrine to consider a virtually adopted child
an "heir" under Florida's homestead provision.246 The court also willingly
held that a virtually adopted child is entitled to inherit from an intestate de-
cedent's estate, despite the fact that the child is unaware of the agreement to
adopt her.247
Virtual adoption is to be invoked where "justice, equity and good faith
require it,''248 but conflicting decisions from various jurisdictions have cer-
tainly contributed to the discrepancies among the courts. 249 For instance, the
Supreme Court of Florida has said that the doctrine is not to be applied prior
to the death of an adoptive parent,250 while the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota held that the child's welfare and best interests should be protected.251
Accordingly, the Florida court held that virtual adoption would not apply to a
worker's compensation proceeding,252 whereas the North Dakota court used
the doctrine to compel child support obligations. 253 Florida courts adhere to
a strict interpretation of virtual adoption, arguing that equitable remedies do
243. See, e.g., Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); Laney, 409
So. 2d at 203; Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
244. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775; see supra p. 571.
245. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323; see supra p. 572.
246. Williams, 714 So. 2d at 576; see supra p. 570.
247. Laney, 409 So. 2d at 203; see supra pp. 569-70.
248. Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604, 607 (N.C. 1997).
249. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that virtual adoption would not warrant relief in a worker's compensation proceeding).
But see Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105-06 (N.D. 2000) (holding that virtual adop-
tion would warrant relief in a divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father to continue
paying child support).
250. Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
251. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
252. Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
253. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105.
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not comport to the statutory scheme.254 Thus, regardless of the negative con-
sequences of limiting the doctrine, Florida consistently maintains that it is to
be invoked exclusively upon the intestate death of an adoptive parent and
solely to provide recourse for virtually adopted children. 55
Nevertheless, when the unique circumstances of a case require it, equity
should resolve what the law cannot. As early as 1977, the Supreme Court of
Alaska followed this logic and determined that the application of virtual
adoption was necessitated by the state's vast cultural landscape. z 6  The
Alaska court reasoned that, where a legal remedy is unavailable, virtual
adoption is an appropriate vehicle with which to avoid hardship to virtually
adopted children.257 Despite this long-standing principle, however, Florida
has yet to follow suit with regard to granting appropriate remedies and equit-
able relief.258 Likewise, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal has often
denied claims of virtually adopted children, arguing that the alleged adoption
was not established by clear and convincing evidence. 2 9 This Florida court
injudiciously ignored the relationship between the claimant and decedent in
spite of the fact that it would be unjust and inequitable to do so.
In each of the aforementioned cases, Florida courts have failed to pro-
vide justice and equity to the virtually adopted children of intestate dece-
dents.260 The courts recognize that the doctrine was intended as a means to
supplement the lack of a legal remedy, but nonetheless refuse to concede to
the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions. Further, although the doctrine
should be used in good faith to provide relief to virtually adopted children,
Florida courts maintain that applying it to extraordinary circumstances would
inescapably lead to an influx of fraudulent claims. 26 1 Thus, while courts in
other jurisdictions increasingly apply the doctrine outside of probate court,
Florida continues to rely on its own precedent and has thus far declined to
extend the doctrine beyond its conventional reach.262 As a result, virtually
254. See Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767.
255. See id.
256. Calista Corp v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977).
257. Id. at 61.
258. See Douglass v. Frazier (In re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Urick v. McFarland, 625 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
259. In re Estate of Musil, 965 So. 2d at 1161; see Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254.
260. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988); In re
Estate of Musil, 965 So. 2d at 1161; Urick, 625 So. 2d at 1254; Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d
321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam); Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774,
775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
261. Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323.
262. Compare, e.g., Tarver, 533 So. 2d at 767 with Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 107 (N.D.
2000).
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adopted children are not getting the recognition they deserve, and they con-
tinue to suffer the harsh consequences of Florida's strict adherence to the
law.
B. Expanding the Doctrine
In theory, virtual adoption is employed "to render a more equitable out-
come," but in practice, the results are quite conflicting.263 If, as the authori-
ties contend, the doctrine truly rests on the theory that "equity regards that as
done that which ought to have been done," 264 then these same authorities
should also contend that limiting the application of the doctrine to intestacy
proceedings is inherently inequitable. Instead, however, courts consistently
deny claims of virtually adopted children, arguing that a virtual adoption
does not supplement or create the relationship of a true parent and child.265
These same courts also argue that virtual adoption is not akin to a legal adop-
tion266 and that virtual adoption merely provides an equitable remedy through
the enforcement of a contract right.
267
In Florida, when the last surviving parent dies intestate, the decedent's
entire estate is to pass to the descendants of the decedent.268 However, Flori-
da statutes strictly define "descendant, '" 269 and when read in conjunction with
the definition of "child," Florida law expressly excludes stepchildren, foster
children, and remote descendants. 270 Thus, although adopted children are
considered descendents of the adopting parent, Florida statutes solely refer to
legally adopted children and do not make reference to those who were mere-
ly virtually or equitably adopted.27'
It may be so that virtual adoption is not wholly analogous to legal adop-
tion, but courts often lose sight of the fact that the doctrine originated as a
means to provide equitable relief in cases where legal relief was not availa-
263. See Warner, supra note 62, at 585.
264. Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1943) (en banc); see also Kelley v. Flag-
ship Nat'l Bank of Boynton Beach (In re Estate of Wall), 502 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); Lankford v. Wright, 489 S.E.2d 604,606 (N.C. 1997).
265. See, e.g., Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 774 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
266. Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988).
267. Grant, 364 So. 2d at 775.
268. FLA. STAT. § 732.103(1) (2010).
269. See id. § 731.201(9) (defining descendants as "a person in any generational level
down the applicable individual's descending line and includes children, grandchildren, and
more remote descendents.").
270. See id. § 731.201(3).
271. See id. § 732.108(1).
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ble.272 When a decedent dies intestate, virtual adoption is designed to allow
the decedent's virtually adopted child to inherit from the decedent's estate as
if the child were legally adopted.273 Virtual adoption has been utilized in
divorce proceedings as well, compelling the parents of virtually adopted
children to continue with their child support obligations.274 Courts have also
applied the doctrine in cases with unusual fact patterns,275 in cases with state-
specific homestead provisions,276 and in cases where the elements of virtual
adoption were not entirely complied with.277
Case law undoubtedly supports the idea that a virtually adopted child
can inherit from an intestate decedent's estate. 278 Even so, there are many
cases in which the court confirmed that a virtual adoption had taken place,
but nonetheless denied the petitioner's claims. 27 9 Thus, it seems wholly con-
tradictory that Florida courts grant equitable remedies to virtually adopted
children in some circumstances, but continually refuse to provide them in
others.
What's more, probate courts generally focus on the testator or dece-
dent's intent in distributing or administering the decedent's estate, while
family law courts generally focus on what is in the best interests of the
child. 28° This, too, is inherently contradictory. How is one court supposed to
put the best interest of the child first, while another court will not even rec-
ognize that same child as being legitimate? It is impossible for a virtually
adopted child to ever be granted relief if courts are continually skirting the
line between decisions which may be equitable and decisions which are
plainly unjust. In order to avoid this anomaly, probate courts and family law
courts need to align and, where appropriate, always focus on what is in the
best interests of the child. Likewise, as virtual adoption is sure to become an
issue of increasing prevalence, courts need to be more steadfast in adopting
principles of equity and public policy in order to more accurately assess in-
dividual cases.
Further, while the criteria may be the same in evaluating claims of vir-
tual adoption, no two courts employ the same reasoning when applying the
272. See Warner, supra note 62, at 585.
273. E.g., Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per cu-
riam).
274. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
275. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61-62 (Alaska 1977).
276. Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
277. See Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that although
the word "adopt" was never used, it would not bar a remedy through virtual adoption).
278. See Warner, supra note 62, at 587.
279. See id.
280. Tritt, supra note 1, at 376.
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requisite elements. Some courts focus too much on the applicable statutes,
while others put too much emphasis on the specific, delineated requirements
of both the contract theory and adoption by estoppel. Additionally, while
some decisions indicate a trend toward more equitable outcomes for virtually
adopted children, there is still a great weight of authority that has prevented
the doctrine from reaching its true potential. Looking at the substantial
amount of case law, there is direct evidence supporting a more comprehen-
sive, cohesive remedy for virtually adopted children. And, comparing the
decisions of the various states that have upheld claims of virtual adoption
inside and outside of probate court, it seems evident that it is time for state
legislatures to formally recognize these informally adopted children.
Similarly, because today's typical family is not the "typical" American
family that once was, Florida's laws are quickly falling behind other jurisdic-
tions which have begun to move in a more appropriate direction. Florida's
sluggish response to support the expansion of virtual adoption is a shortcom-
ing, at best. The longer Florida courts wait to apply the doctrine in all cases
in which equity requires avoiding an unjust outcome, the farther Florida will
be departing from its strong public policy in favor of the cohesive family unit
and doing what is in the best interests of the children. And, while there is
validity to the argument that expanding the doctrine will lead to an influx of
frivolous claims, there are other avenues which are better suited to deal with
these concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida was not the first state to recognize the equitable doctrine of vir-
tual adoption, and it certainly will not be the last.28' Further, although the
doctrine has progressed significantly in recent years, there still remain a
number of ambiguities and inconsistencies in its application.282 Virtual
adoption was originally intended to be applied to children who were sup-
posed to be legally adopted, but whose adoptive parents failed to complete a
formal adoption prior to dying intestate. 83 The doctrine relies on equitable
principles, and it operates to allow the virtually adopted child to take an in-
281. See Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam);
see also Habecker, 474 F.2d at 1229; Douglass v. Frazier (in re Estate of Musil), 965 So. 2d
1157, 1159 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Williams v. Estate of Pender, 783 So. 2d 453, 454
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
282. Compare Williams v. Dorrell, 714 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), with
Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323, and Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982), and Grant v. Sedco Corp., 364 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
283. E.g., Miller, 591 So. 2d at 322.
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testate share from the decedent equal to that of a legally adopted or biologi-
cal child. 284 However, in light of recent decisions, it appears the doctrine is
growing ever more popular, and courts are more frequently called upon to
expand the scope of its applicability.
285
What's more, as the dynamic of the typical American family continues
to evolve, so too do the applicable statutes which dictate the rights of inherit-
ance in both testate and intestate proceedings.286 Further, with the steady
increase in the number of children adopted each year, Florida courts will
likewise see a steady increase in the number of adopted children contesting
their inheritance rights. Nonetheless, Florida has yet to align with other ju-
risdictions and apply the doctrine to provide a wide range of equitable reme-
dies.287 Accordingly, it is unlikely that the claims of virtually adopted child-
ren will withstand even minimal judicial scrutiny in the near future.
In order for virtually adopted children to be granted the relief they seek,
Florida courts need to expand the scope of virtual adoption and apply it out-
side of probate court, and in situations other than intestacy proceedings. The
only way that the doctrine will, in good faith, provide justice and equity is if
Florida accepts the reasoning set forth by other jurisdictions and allows vir-
tual adoption to be recognized both in probate court and in other areas of the
law.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 105 (N.D. 2000).
286. Bell, supra note 24, at 418.
287. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988) (hold-
ing that virtual adoption would not warrant relief in a worker's compensation proceeding).
But see Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 105 (holding that virtual adoption would warrant relief in a
divorce proceeding, obliging the adoptive father to continue paying child support).
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